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Abstract. This article examines elite European discourses during the Greek financial crisis from its pre-
history in September 2008 up to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015. The article
employs the conceptual literature on Discursive Institutionalism (DI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI).
Having coded 1,153 unique quotes drawn from a dataset of 15,354 news wires from Reuters, the authors
argue that the communicative discourse of 63 senior European (and IMF) officials on the Greek crisis
during that period demonstrates significant volatility. Four distinct narrative frames are identified: ‘neglect’,
‘suspicious cooperation’, ‘blame’ and ‘reluctant redemption’,punctuated by three discursive junctures in 2010,
2011 and 2012, which reflect the content of the changing communicative discourse of the Greek crisis. The
article’s contribution is twofold: empirically, it is the first to provide a systematic analysis of the protagonists’
communication of the Greek crisis; and theoretically, it combines DI and HI in an effort to conceptualise an
important part of our understanding of ‘bail-out politics’ throughout the Eurozone crisis.
Keywords: discourse; Greece; Eurozone; crisis; institutionalism
Introduction
There is no shortage of literature discussing the Eurozone crisis and the deficiencies of the
EU’s economic architecture in recent years (see, e.g., Dinan 2012; Pisani-Ferry 2014). The
role of ideas and discourse in themanaging of theEurozone crisis has also attracted scholarly
attention, albeit with variable degrees of empirical depth (see Schmidt 2014; Ntampoudi
2014; Borriello & Crespy 2015). The literature has produced some important insights into
the role of the media in framing a polarised picture, with often conflicting results about the
discourse(s) that emerged during the crisis. For instance, a number of studies highlighted a
process of ‘othering’ and blaming, with often biblical references to the main protagonists of
the crisis as ‘saints’ (creditors) and ‘sinners’ (bail-out recipients) (Wodak & Angouri 2014;
Kutter 2014). Others point to ideological cleavages between neo-Keynesianism and neo-
liberalism in understanding and framing the crisis (Schmidt 2014). Moreover, the literature
has producedmixed results on whether a common ‘European’ discourse has emerged. Some
scholars have highlighted predominantly national discourses on the origins of the crisis (cf.
Picard 2015; Nienstedt et al. 2015), while others have suggested the existence of a more
Europeanised narrative with common frames (not least between Spain and Germany) on
‘conditionality’ and ‘competitiveness’,among others (Kaiser&Kleinen-vonKönigslöw 2016,
2017).
Yet, much of the existing literature has focused primarily on how the media (e.g.,
newspaper editorials and reporting) has depicted the crisis, rather than the actual statements
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made by key policy makers across EU institutions and member states. In addition, most
available studies focus on relatively short time segments of the crisis. As a result, our
knowledge of the discursive evolution of the EU’s bail-out crisis management over the past
eight years remains rather fragmented. This gap manifests itself as both an empirical and
methodological puzzle: the challenge is not simply to trace the content of elite discourse, but
to identify credible measures that can substantiate claims over its continuity and change.
Driven by these challenges, this article focuses on the evolution of European discourses
on the ‘rescue’ of Greece as a crucially important subset of the wider management of the
Eurozone crisis. We focus our analysis on discourses by key senior officials involved in the
design and implementation of Greece’s bail-out programmes rather than the wider public
debate on the fate of Greece, which also included the media and other more specialised
epistemic communities. The timeframe of our analysis stretches from the ‘pre-history’ of
the Greek crisis (the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008 in the outset of the
global financial crisis) to the arrival of the SYRIZA government in January 2015 on an
openly hostile ticket to the euro bail-outs, potentially marking a new phase in the country’s
relationship with its creditors. By reference to the literatures on Discursive Institutionalism
(DI) and Historical Institutionalism (HI), and using an extensive dataset of quotes from
Reuters newswires, we argue that elite narratives on the Greek crisis during that period
have demonstrated significant volatility.We identify four distinct narrative frames: ‘neglect’,
‘suspicious cooperation’, ‘blame’ and ‘reluctant redemption’.We argue that these frames have
been the result of three ‘critical moments’ (materialising into ‘discursive critical junctures’)
in 2010, 2011 and 2012, during which intensive media attention on theGreek crisis produced
‘windows of opportunity’ for the (re-)casting of its communicative discourse. We do not
equate these narrative frames (either in terms of content or timing) to the actual EU
strategy during the crisis. The latter was shaped by a wider set of parameters (not least by
intergovernmental and inter-institutional bargaining), not all of which fall under the scope
of this article. The examination of elite discourses, however, provides crucial insights into
how key policy makers responded to the Greek crisis, both in terms of the content of their
legitimising narrative and its evolution through important junctures of the crisis.
The Greek crisis through a DI perspective
The role of ideas in political science has attracted a huge body of literature, encompassing
many different theoretical perspectives and methodological traditions within the discipline
(see, e.g., Gramsci 1971; Bourdieu 1990; Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith 1993). More recently,
the literature on DI (Campbell & Pedersen 2001; Schmidt 2008, 2010, 2014; Boswell &
Hampshire 2016) has sought to recast our understanding of narrative frames and link them
to existing scholarship on New Institutionalism (NI) (for a review, see Hall & Taylor 1996;
March & Olsen 2005) in the form of a new variant. Schmidt (2008: 3) posits that ‘discourse’
allows for a broader understanding of the role of ideas by encompassing not only their
content, but also the processes by which they are conveyed and exchanged.
Schmidt distinguishes between coordinative and communicative discourse. The former
involves the interaction between epistemic communities (Haas 1992) ‘at the centre of policy
construction who are involved in the creation, elaboration and justification of policy and
programmatic ideas’ (Schmidt 2008: 310). Communicative discourse, on the other hand,
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is primarily conducted in the realm of politics whereby political actors seek to legitimise
policy preferences and ‘sell’ them to the public/electorate (Schmidt 2008: 310). The pattern
of interaction between the two types of discourse varies according to circumstance: it can be
sequential (with coordinative discourses preceding communicative ones), cyclical (involving
a ‘feedback loop’ between the two) or, indeed, disjointed, whereby the two are not ‘in sync’
due to the highly technical or controversial nature of the policy involved. In all cases, the
role of political leadership in interweaving coordinative and communicative discourses is
paramount. It is this mediation that produces the ‘master discourse’ – the ‘vision of where
the polity is, where it is going, and where it ought to go’ (Schmidt 2008: 311).
Critical to the way in which Schmidt has sought to position DI as a distinct variant
of NI is her approach to institutional change and the role of ideas within this process.
Unlike HI and Sociological Institutionalism, Schmidt’s approach is agency-driven (focusing
on ‘sentient’ agents), whereas (unlike Rationalist Institutionalism and HI), ‘institutions’
are defined as ‘internal [to actors] ideational constructs and structures’ (Schmidt 2010:
16). Hence, institutional change is explained by reference to political actors’ ‘foreground
discursive abilities’ to communicate critically about their institutions and ultimately steer
them towards change (Schmidt 2008, 2010).
The interaction between discourse and institutions, however, can also be articulated
‘in the reverse’, focusing on how institutional affiliations can affect processes of discursive
continuity and change over time (see, inter alia, Carstensen 2011a,b; Stanley 2012). In
order to interrogate the circumstances under which discursive shifts occur, we employ the
literature on HI which has emphasised the importance of ‘critical junctures’ as moments
where path dependencies or established equilibria are disrupted, giving rise to institutional
reconfiguration or the recalibration of interests and social norms (Krasner 1988; Berins-
Collier & Collier 1991; Pierson 2000; Capoccia & Kelemen 2007). Concepts such as ‘critical
junctures’ and ‘paradigm shifts’ within the NI tradition are not without their critics, not least
because of the difficulty in substantiating them empirically,but also clarifying the underlying
causalities behind their emergence (see Thelen & Steinmo 1992; Schmidt 2010).
To account for this critique, we define specific conditions for the identification of
discursive critical moments and junctures. Critical moments are evidenced by significant
peaks in the number of news articles dealing with Greece’s financial crisis. The selection
of such a quantitative criterion is not fool-proof and still involves a degree of discretion
on our behalf, particularly in deciding how many of these peaks are examined. Yet, this
approach allows greater consistency in the identification of critical moments compared with
other qualitative criteria (e.g., elections, key European Council meetings) or market data,
whose wild fluctuations do, in any case, feature in the media coverage. Critical junctures,
on the other hand, are defined by reference to significant fluctuations in the content of the
creditors’ discourse as evidenced by the coding systemwe employ (seemethodology below).
This article focuses on the communicative discourse of European elites towards the
Greek crisis and does not delve into the coordinative discourse contained in (confidential
or otherwise) communications between the protagonists in order to determine policy.
Although we recognise the apparent inter-connection between communicative discourse
and chosen policy, we treat the two arenas as analytically distinct. Hence, we urge caution
against equating discursive and policy junctures or assuming that the two take place
simultaneously or that they are premised on the exact same foundations. Often, discursive
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shifts can occur either prior to or after major rethinks of policy and/or strategy. In the
context of the Greek bail-out, policy change also involved delicate inter-institutional and
intergovernmental negotiations which complicate the identification of causalities further.
Methodology and data collection
In order to substantiate theoretically informed claims on the continuity and change of the
discursive handling of the Greek crisis, we use the English language electronic depository
of Reuters newswires (the largest of its kind in the world) to trace the communicative
discourse of elite European policy makers from the collapse of Lehman Brothers on 15
September 2008 up to the election of the SYRIZA government in Greece on 25 January
2015, which inaugurated a new phase in Greece’s relationship with its creditors and whose
discursive implications are still unfolding. We have identified a total of 26 posts (involving
63 individuals) directly involved in the Greek crisis (see Table 1). These include the Heads
of Government and Finance Ministers of ten Eurozone members involving both ‘core’
(Germany, France, Netherlands, Finland, Austria)1 and ‘periphery’ states (Cyprus, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain)2 as well as the leaders of key institutions responsible for managing the
crisis such as theDirector of the IMF; the Presidents of the European Council, the European
Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission and the Eurogroup; and the European
Commissioner for Financial Affairs.
Using searches that contained the terms ‘Greece’, ‘crisis’ and ‘said’ we recovered a total
of 15,354 articles from the Reuters archives, published in English (see Figure 1).3 Using the
names of the 63 individuals identified above we recovered 1,153 unique quotes that made
reference to or was an evaluation of the Greek crisis and/or bail-out(s) (see Figure 2).4 Our
search did not include the use of synonyms (e.g., ‘Greek’, ‘Hellenic’, ‘Chancellor’) or quotes
that were not attributed to a named individual (e.g., ‘German official’).
Instead of using random sampling or seeking to analyse inductively frames or keywords
that policy makers use (cf. Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw 2016, 2017), we opted to
code each quote using an ordinal scale between –2 and +2. The value –2 denominates a
punitive stance towardsGreece.Quotes falling under this classificationmaymake references
to Greece’s ‘cheating’ and the necessary ‘punishment’ that the EU’s response should
entail, mainly Greece’s exit from the Eurozone (‘Grexit’). References to Greece being a
‘bottomless pit’ or of Greece’s Eurozone membership being a ‘mistake’ also denominates
strongly negative attitudes.Typically for quotes falling under this category,Greece’s financial
problems are attributed solely to domestic factors – most notably corruption, clientelism
(cf. Afonso et al. 2015) and the incompetence of the country’s political elites which creates
problems for the Eurozone and should be overcome by pushing Greece out.
The value –1 denominates support for ‘hard conditionality’ in exchange of financial
support. The quotes under this category are underpinned by the ‘moral hazard’ premise
(cf. De Grauwe 2013: 17–19) and the need for a ‘robust’ programme for Greece under the
surveillance of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Unlike the previous category, the
threat of Grexit is never explicitly mentioned, but it is implied only if Greece neglects its
commitments to the creditors. The assessment of the reform efforts of the government in
Athens is typically negative and Greece’s troubles are rarely placed in the context of wider
Eurozone dysfunctionalities.
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Table 1. List of post-holders examined, as of 25 January 2015
Country/
Institution Position Name of post-holder Term of office
Germany Chancellor Angela Merkel Nov 2005–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Wolfgang Schäuble Oct 2009–Incumbent
France President Nicolas Sarkozy May 2007–May 2012
Francois Hollande May 2012–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Christine Lagarde Jun 2007–Jun 2011
François Baroin Jun 2011–May 2012
Pierre Moscovici May 2012–Mar 2014
Michel Sapin Apr 2014–Incumbent
Netherlands Prime Minister Jan Peter Balkenende Jul 2002–Oct 2010
Mark Rutte Oct 2010–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Woulter Bos Feb 2007–Feb 2010
Jan Kees de Jager Feb 2010–Nov 2012
Jeron Dijsselbloem Nov 2012–Jan 2013*
Austria Chancellor Alfred Gusenbauer Jan 2007–Dec 2008
Werner Faymann Dec 2008–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Wilhelm Molterer Jan 2007–Dec 2008
Josef Pröll Dec 2008–Apr 2011
Maria Fekter Apr 2011–Dec 2013
Michael Spindelegger Dec 2013–Sep 2014
Hans Jorg Schelling Sep 2014–Incumbent
Finland Prime Minister Matti Vanhanen Jun 2003–Jun 2010
Mari Kiviniemi Jun 2010–Jun 2011
Jyrki Katainen Jun 2011–Jun 2014
Alexander Stubb Jun 2014–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Jyrki Katainen Apr 2007–Jun 2011
Jutta Urpilainen Jun 2011–Jun 2014
Antti Rinne Jun 2014–Incumbent
Ireland Prime Minister Brian Cowen May 2008–Mar 2011
Enda Kenny Mar 2011–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Brian Lenihan May 2008–Mar 2011
Michael Noonan Mar 2011–Incumbent
Italy Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi May 2008–Nov 2011
Mario Monti Nov 2011–Apr 2013
Enrico Letta Apr 2013–Feb 2014
Matteo Renzi Feb 2014–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Giulio Tremonti May 2008–Nov 2011
Mario Monti (interim) Nov 2011–Jul 2012
Vittorio Grilli Jul 2012–Apr 2013
(Continued)
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Table 1. Continued
Country/
Institution Position Name of post-holder Term of office
Fabrizio Saccomanni Apr 2013–Feb 2014
Pier Carlo Padoan Feb 2014–Incumbent
Spain Prime Minister Jose L R Zapatero Apr 2004–Dec 2011
Mariano Rajoy Dec 2011–Incumbent
Minister of Economy &
Finance/ Competitiveness
Pedro Solbes Apr 2004–Apr 2009
Elena Salgado Apr 2009–Dec 2011
Luis de Guindos Dec 2011–Incumbent
Cyprus President Demetris Christofias Feb 2008–Feb 2013
Nicos Anastasiades Feb 2013–Incumbent
Minister of Finance Charilaos Stavrakis Feb 2008–Aug 2011
Kikis Kazamias Aug 2011–Mar 2012
Vassos Shiarly Mar 2012–Feb 2013
Michael Sarris Feb 2013–Apr 2013
Charis Georgiades Apr 2013–Incumbent
Portugal Prime Minister José Sócrates de Carvalho
Pinto de Sousa
Mar 2005–Jun 2011
Pedro Passos Coelho Jun 2011–Incumbent
Finance Minister Fernando Teixeira dos
Santos
Jul 2005–Jun 2011
Vítor Gaspar Jun 2011–Jul 2013
Maria Luís Albuquerque Jul 2013–Incumbent
European
Council
President Herman Von Rompuy Dec 2009–Nov 2014
Donald Tusk Dec 2014–Incumbent
Commission President Jose Manuel Barroso Nov 2004–Nov 2014
Jean-Claude Juncker Nov 2014–Incumbent
Commissioner ECO&FIN Joaquin Almunia Apr 2004–Feb 2010
Olli Rehn Feb 2010–Jul 2014
Jyrki Katainen Jul 2014–Nov 2014
Pierre Moscovisi Nov 2014–Incumbent
Eurogroup President Jean-Claude Juncker Jan 2005–Jan 2013
Jeron Dijsselbloem Jan 2013–Incumbent
IMF Director Dominique Strauss-Kahn Nov 2007–May 2011
Christine Lagarde Jul 2011–Incumbent
ECB President Jean-Claude Trichet Nov 2003–Nov 2011
Mario Draghi Nov 2011–Incumbent
Notes: *Appointed as Eurogroup President.
Source: Authors’ own calculations.
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Figure 1. Number of Reuters articles containing the terms ‘Greece’, ‘Financial’ and ‘Crisis’, per week (Total:
15,354). [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 2. Number of unique quotes on Greece per week (Total: 1,153). [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
The value 0 denominates neutrality and/or neglect whereby no explicit promises or
threats against Greece are made. In the early stages of the crisis, quotes under this category
typically fail to acknowledge that Greece (or indeed the Eurozone) was facing a crisis.
Subsequently, neutral statements may defer opinion to the future – for example, after
a forthcoming assessment of the programme or a relevant EU meeting. Statements of
neutralitymay also be connected with forthcoming elections inGreece,with European elites
choosing not to interfere with the domestic party-political competition (‘fence sitting’).
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The value +1 denominates a preference for ‘soft conditionality’ towards Greece. A
typical quote in this category acknowledges Greece’s irreversible membership of the
Eurozone, but at the same time presses the government in Athens to stick to its side of the
bargain. Under this category, statements tend to emphasise the dangers of contagion from
a possible Grexit and point to the deficiencies of the Eurozone’s economic governance. On
the other hand, the assessment of domestic reform is typically portrayed as ‘positive’ or
‘encouraging’.
The value+2 assigns strong support forGreece’s Eurozonemembership.The potential of
Grexit is seen as ‘inconceivable’ and much of the blame for Greece’s predicament is placed
on the design of the bail-out programme itself, rather than its domestic implementation.The
underpinning principle of ‘solidarity’ takes precedence over conditionality or the ‘moral
hazard’ thesis. Quotes falling under this category also mobilise historical or purely political
arguments – not least the protection of Greece’s democracy and halting the rise of the neo-
Nazi Golden Dawn party.
Although we are confident that there is sufficient distinctiveness between the different
values in our scale, we acknowledge that coding of each individual quote is not fool-proof.
Sometimes, the quotes mobilise a mix of rewards and threats that cut across the typology we
devised. Hence, the selection of a single value contains an inevitable element of discretion
on behalf of the coder. The coding was conducted by two of the three co-authors of the
article who assigned a single value to each quote independently of each other. To ensure the
coding was reliable we used Cohen’s Kappa,which is a measure of inter-rater agreement for
ordinal variables, with reliability coefficients ranging from 0.92 to 0.88 (Bryman 2015: 276).5
We are also constrained by the fact that Reuters typically publishes only a small extract
from longer speeches or statements made by the officials in question. This editorial decision
in itself ‘contaminates’ our sample and can skew the message intended by the official who
delivered it. In this respect, the context, timing and the target audience of each individual
statement also form important contextual information that help nuance any given discourse
analysis. Yet, given the size of our sample, access to full transcripts (and other contextual
information) was not possible. We argue that what has been lost in terms of narrative
richness in our data collection strategy is counterbalanced by the comprehensive coverage
offered by the Reuters database.
Employing a inductive approach we identify three critical moments during which
Greece’s future within the Eurozone came under the most intense media scrutiny,6 reflected
in significant peaks in the number ofReuters newswires during the corresponding week (see
Figure 1): (a) the signing of the first Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the
Greek government and its creditors on 3 May 2010 (a total of 465 wires between 3 and
9 May 2010); (b) the calling of a referendum on the second bail-out by the Greek Prime
Minister George Papandreou, on 31 October 2011 (a total of 267 wires between 31 October
and 6 November 2011); and (c) the formation of a pro-bail-out ‘grand coalition’ government
in Greece, following the general election of 17 June 2012 under Prime Minister Antonis
Samaras (a total of 196 wires between 11 and 17 June 2012).
In line with Hay (2016) and Blyth (2002), we argue that such pivotal events open up
space for political competition, providing ‘windows of opportunity’ for European elites
to (re-)cast their communicative discourse towards Greece. Yet, these critical moments
do not necessarily signify a major discursive departure by European elites. Hence, we
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hypothesise that discursive critical junctions materialise only when we can observe
significant fluctuations in the average opinion scores by European elites (using our coding
scale) during the intervening periods (see Figure 3). In order to account for discursive
changes between periods we look into four sets of data: (1) the distribution of opinion scores
of individual actors, clustered per institution, country or groups of countries (i.e., ‘core’
and ‘periphery’); (2) the share of individual countries or institutions in the total number of
quotes; (3) the correlation coefficients between quotes by the main stakeholders, clustered
around key cleavages (i.e., ‘core versus periphery’, ‘ideology’, ‘German leadership’, ‘Troika
institutions’), tracing their relational evolution over time; and (4) the correlation coefficients
between the average opinion scores on Greece and the evolution of the country’s ten-year
bond yields. These are examined in more detail in the penultimate section of the article.
We acknowledge that in practice these discursive shifts can never be ‘cleanly’ separated
as they form part of the constant process of (re-)evaluating the complexities of the crisis (see
Figure 4).Neither does the timing and content of policy change neatlymap onto shifts in elite
discourses.Yet,by examining the evolution of opinion scores of European elites before/after
these criticalmoments,wemaintain that it is possible to define discursively distinctive phases
of the Greek crisis, thus allowing for a more nuanced analysis of the factors that shaped
(anti-)bail-out strategies during the timeframe of our examination.
Neglect: European discourses during the ‘pre-history’ of the Greek crisis, September
2008–May 2010
This initial period of the Greek crisis stretches from the collapse of Lehman Brothers on
15 September 2008 to the signing of the first MoU between Greece and its creditors on
3May 2010.During these 21months the terms ‘Greece’, ‘financial’ and ‘crisis’ feature in 2,653
Reuters newswires,with 258 quotes onGreecemade by the senior policymakers identified in
our sample (see Figure 3).This is the period with the lowest density of quotes per week,with
the vast majority of these concentrated after the electoral victory of George Papandreou in
Greece in October 2009 (see Figure 2).
The relative neglect of Greece during this period should be understood in the context of
a wider European discourse of denial about the intensity and reach of the gathering financial
meltdown which was very much seen as ‘an American problem’ (Fuchs & Graaf 2010: 14).
During that time, EU policy makers produced a cacophony of ideas over the nature of the
unfolding crisis, its possible remedy and the best-equipped institution to administer it.Voices
urging theEU to adopt anAmerican-style fiscal stimulus package faced outright rejection by
the German administration, forcing senior EU officials, including Jean-Claude Juncker and
Joaquin Almunia to urge that ‘fiscal policy should be maintained on a sustainable course’
and that the Eurozone did not need a ‘revival package’ (Reuters, 3 November 2008).
In the meantime, the growing concerns about Greece’s deteriorating economic situation
were brushed away by the centre right government in Athens as ‘malicious rumours’.7 A
similar complacency was also evident during the early days of the socialist government
under George Papandreou, following PASOK’s landslide victory in the November 2009
election on the promise of fiscal expansion (cf. Zartaloudis 2013). The Pandora’s Box was
opened in the October 2009 ECOFIN Council when the Greek Finance Minister revealed
that the country’s deficit was around 12.5 per cent of gross domestic product (GDP),8
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Figure 3. Average opinion scores on Greece and evolution of borrowing costs, per week. [Colour figure can
be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
Figure 4. Distribution of opinion scores, per period. [Colour figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]
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rather than 6 per cent as previously reported (Reuters, 20 October 2009). Although the
announcement threw the financial markets into turmoil and produced a media frenzy (see
Figure 1),EU officials remained entrenched in their ‘no-bail-out’ discourse. In January 2010,
Papandreou and senior EU officials dismissed claims that a bail-out package was secretly
being negotiated (Reuters, 29 January 2010). According to European Central Bank (ECB)
President Trichet, ‘each country has its own problems. It [the Greek budgetary crisis] is a
problem that has to be solved at home. It is your own responsibility’ (Elliott 2010).
In truth, however, the announcement of the revised budgetary figures for Greece and the
country’s effective cutting off from the financial markets in early 2010 made the elaboration
of an EU-sponsored rescue plan inevitable. In the months that followed, European leaders
tread a very fine line: on the one hand, reassuring the markets that the Eurozone was ready
‘to take determined and coordinated action, if needed’ while at the same time maintaining
that the bailing out of Greece was not on the cards (European Council 2010). This line was
also reinforced by ECB President Trichet, who, in late March 2010, sought to reassure by
saying that: ‘I am confident that the mechanism decided today [the European Financial
Stability Facility (EFSF)] will normally not need to be activated and that Greece will
progressively regain the confidence of the market’ (Reuters, 25 March 2010). Although
preparations for the rescue of Greece were gathering pace in the background, the discursive
taboo of ‘no-bail-out’ was not yet broken.
Suspicious cooperation: The discourse of the first Greek bail-out, May 2010–October
2011
During the period 4 May 2010–31 October 2011, media interest in the Greek crisis
skyrocketed, with elite discourses demonstrating significant volatility. This is reflective of
the early optimism that the Papandreou government would be able to deliver on ambitious
targets for deficit reduction, before shifting towards negativity as the progress of domestic
reformbegan to losemomentum (see Figure 4).Over the sameperiod, the number ofReuters
newswiresmatching our search criteria increased (yearly adjusted) threefold to 7,204 and the
number of quotes in our sample reached 460 (see Figures 1 and 3).This is the second highest
density of quotes/per week in our entire dataset (see Figure 2).
In communicative terms, the departure from the previous EU stance of ‘no bail-out’ was
seemingly justified on the premise of Greek exceptionalism. In this context, the ‘rescue’ of
Greece was not seen as symptomatic of structural weakness in the design of the Eurozone,
but rather the outcome of the country’s chronic economic mismanagement by a corrupt and
untrustworthy political elite.A big part of theGreek exceptionalist discourse was centred on
the concealment of Greece’s economic implosion under the ‘Greek statistics’ fiasco which
resulted in a catastrophic collapse of credibility. Economically, Greece’s exceptionalism
manifested in its ‘triple deficit’ problem: the largest debt-to-GDP ratio in the Eurozone,
compounded by huge budget and current account deficits.
In this context the ECB President argued that ‘the euro itself, is by the way, a very
solid currency. It’s clear that Greece is a very special case and the reason we are here’
(Reuters, 4 May 2010). Statements to that effect were made, among others, by the IMF
Director, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, who suggested that ‘this crisis is actually a Greek crisis’
(Reuters, 17 May 2010). The position of the newly elected Papandreou government within
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this narrative was precarious as Greece’s creditors needed Papandreou on board, yet there
was suspicion over his ability to deliver (Reuters, 3 May 2010; Schmidt 2013).
This suspicion went part and parcel with the wider discussion on the ‘moral hazard’
associated with the EU’s bail-out policy. Narratives on conditionality and rule observance
became dominant in this respect and were echoed by key policy makers managing the
Eurozone crisis. For instance, German Chancellor Angela Merkel reassured that the Greek
programme had ‘strict economic and legal preconditions’ attached to it (Reuters, 14 May
2010). Her Finance Minister,Wolfgang Schäuble, went a step further: ‘[W]e need a broader
sanctions mechanism to get the moral hazard problem in the euro zone under control’
(Reuters, 23 September 2010).Calls for strict bail-out conditionality and external verification
of compliance (in the form of IMF involvement under the so-called ‘Troika’ of European
Commission, ECB and IMF) also reflected a significant erosion of trust in the ability of the
Commission to oversee Greece’s adjustment.
By mid-2011, as the political stock of the Papandreou government evaporated and the
crisis began to spread to other peripheral economies in the Eurozone, the sustainability of
the Greek programme came under increasing scrutiny. So, too, did the entire stability of the
Eurozone.Followingmonths of acrimonious negotiations betweenGreece and its Eurozone
partners, a deal was reached, in July 2011, for a second bail-out worth €100 billion including
the first restructuring of privately held sovereign debt of a Eurozone member (Reuters, 21
July 2011).Yet,despite some initial optimism, the July agreement was soon discredited for its
complexity and for doing little to reassure the markets over the adequacy of the Eurozone’s
‘firewall’ and the long-term sustainability of the Greek debt.
Divided over what to do next, European leaders produced a cacophony of responses
which further aggravatedmarket fears over the euro. InAugust 2011,EuropeanCommission
President Barroso criticised ‘the undisciplined communication of EU leaders’, while French
President Nicolas Sarkozy pleaded with his opposite numbers ‘to move on from these
national quarrels and get back to the sense of our common destiny. … It’s everyone’s duty
to do everything needed to safeguard the stability of the euro’ (Reuters, 16 June 2011). In
the run-up to a new EU summit in October 2011 to review the situation in the Eurozone,
European discourses on Greece grew increasingly hostile with some (including the Dutch
Prime Minister and the leader of Germany’s right-wing junior governing coalition partner,
the FreeDemocratic Party) openly calling forGreece’s ejection from theEurozone (Reuters,
7 September 2011). The German Finance Minister fell short of publicly endorsing these
calls, but remained coy: ‘It would be a bad government if it didn’t try to prepare for things
you can’t even imagine’ (Reuters, 12 September 2011). President Sarkozy called Greece’s
Eurozone membership ‘a mistake’ (Reuters, 27 October 2011). The discursive taboo of
Grexit was now beginning to erode.
Blame: Enter ‘Grexit’, November 2011–June 2012
As Eurozone leaders struggled to contain the crisis, the pressure on the Papandreou
government in Greece intensified. In a desperate attempt to regain legitimacy, Papandreou
called for a referendum on the terms of the second Greek bail-out (Reuters, 31 October
2011). The unexpected announcement caused mayhem in the financial markets and
threatened to derail the entire package of EU measures agreed just weeks before.
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Outraged by what they regarded as Papandreou’s unreliability and recklessness,EU leaders,
spearheaded by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel, brought Grexit to the forefront
of their discourses in an attempt to force the Greek government to retract the referendum
announcement (Reuters, 2 November 2011; 3 November 2011). Papandreou had overplayed
his hand and his time was now up.By the end of that week his resignation paved the way for
the appointment of an interim coalition government under the former ECBVice-President,
Loucas Papademos.
The political drama in Athens attracted intense media interest. For the period 1
November 2011–17 June 2012, Reuters published a total of 2,725 newswires matching
our search criteria, with 239 unique quotes on Greece by European elites (the largest
concentration of quotes per week for the entire period of the study) (see Figures 1 and
2). The arrival of Papademos at the helm might have assured European leaders that the
country now had a safe pair of hands who could see through the complexities of Greece’s
debt restructuring programme, which remained high on the media agenda during the first
months of 2012, but widespread mistrust against the political elites in Athens remained
(see Figure 4). Against this background, European discourses on Greece remained hostile
throughout Papademos’ term. For instance, both the Dutch and Finnish Prime Ministers
openly discussed the prospects of Greece’s exit from the Eurozone (Reuters, 7 February
2012; 15 May 2012) and Schäuble described Greece as a ‘bottomless pit’ (Reuters, 21
February 2012).
In the run-up to the Greek parliamentary election of May 2012,European policy makers
put significant pressure on all political parties to commit to the continuation of the austerity
measures – a position strongly advocated by many commentators in the German press
(for a review, see Allen 2012). Widespread public hostility against the bail-out programme,
however, strengthened anti-systemic forces in Greece on both the left and the right of the
political spectrum (cf. Zartaloudis 2013). The inconclusive result of the May election and
the subsequent impasse over the formation of a coalition government further aggravated
European policy makers. In this context, the fresh electoral contest of June 2012 was widely
articulated as an ‘in-or-out’ referendum on Greece’s membership of the Eurozone – a
message that also echoed by the newly elected French President after his first meeting with
British Prime Minister David Cameron (Reuters, 18 May 2012).
In the aftermath of the election,a ‘grand’ coalition betweenNDand PASOKwas formed,
supporting Greece’s continuing engagement with its creditors. The new Greek Prime
Minister,Antonis Samaras,had travelled a longway since his days as a fierce critic of the bail-
out programme, to reinvent himself as the ‘guarantor’ of Greece’s ‘European orientation’
(Samaras 2012). To their European counterparts, Samaras and Evangelos Venizelos (leader
of PASOK and Deputy Prime Minister), epitomised much of what had gone wrong with
Greece in the past. Yet, their unlikely coalition partnership offered the prospect of a stable
government and a faint hope that the terms of the second bail-out would be implemented.
Redemption appeared to be on the cards, but Athens was called to do more.
Nowhere else to go: The politics of reluctant redemption, June 2012–January 2015
The arrival of the pro-bail-out government might have ended a summer of high political
drama in Athens, but fears over financial ‘contagion’ across the Eurozone intensified as the
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economic health of Italy and Spain came under greater scrutiny (Reuters, 30 November
2011). This uncertainty was compounded by the election, in April 2012, of French Socialist
PresidentHollande amid concerns of rising discord within the Franco-German axis (Reuters,
7 May 2012). Against this background, European stakes in Greece’s reform commitment
increased further. Indeed, the European discourses during the first few months of Samaras’
premiership remained rather negative (see Figure 4).TheGermanChancellor’s caution over
the new government was reflective of this mood: ‘[W]e will not make premature judgments
but will await reliable evidence’ (Reuters, 24 August 2012).
The turning point seems to have come in November 2012, when the coalition
government in Athens pushed another major round of budgetary cuts through parliament
(cf. Zartaloudis 2014).Greece’s creditors reciprocated by agreeing the release of €43 billion
in assistance, alongside other measures for lowering the country’s debt burden and a
commitment to providing further debt relief in the future. In the aftermath of the deal, both
President Hollande and the European Council President, Herman Van Rompuy, appeared
confident that the worst of the Eurozone crisis was now over. Barroso was also in a buoyant
mood: ‘[O]nce again we have shown that we have the capacity to act and we are able to do
whatever is necessary for a firm and sustained irreversibility of the euro as a currency of the
European Union’ (European Commission 2012).
In themonths that followed,European discourses onGrexit began tomellow (see Figure
4) and media interest in Greece subsided considerably, particularly as Italy and Spain came
to dominate the EU agenda. Between 18 June 2012 and 25 January 2015, we uncovered a
total of 2,772 articles on the Greek crisis – a quarter of that of the preceding period, yearly
adjusted (see Figure 1). The 196 unique quotes on Greece we identified during these 30
months also represent the least ‘vocal’ period in our entire dataset. The improvement of
Greece’s international profile was further boosted by the release, in early 2014, of economic
figures showing the first tentative signs that the worst of the Greek crisis was coming to an
end (European Commission 2014). The government in Athens was quick to claim that the
country was now becoming the Eurozone’s ‘success story’ (Reuters, 1 April 2014).
Such a bold claim was directed to both a domestic and an international audience.
Domestically, Prime Minister Samaras hoped to halt the rising popularity of anti-austerity
SYRIZA,which by nowwas demanding the resignation of the government and the calling of
fresh elections (Reuters, 3 November 2014). Internationally, the government sought to strike
a better deal with Greece’s creditors in the context of the fifth (and final) assessment of the
country’s bail-out programme in the summer of 2014. A few months earlier, the German
Chancellor had hinted at Greece’s partial rehabilitation by paying a highly symbolic visit to
Athens (the first time since the outbreak of the crisis), during which she praised the Greek
government ‘for fulfilling its pledges’ (Reuters, 11 April 2014).
Merkel’s visit to Athens might have boosted Samaras’ profile, but, by summer, the
Greek Prime Minister’s pleas for the relaxation of austerity met with stiff opposition
by the German government. The language this time was diplomatic, but the message
uncompromising: ‘Greece must resolutely continue to implement the agreed reforms. In its
own interests. Being reliable creates confidence – also on the markets,’ argued the German
Finance Minister (Reuters, 19 October 2014). As Greece’s efforts to return to the financial
markets in the summer of 2014 met with only limited success (Reuters, 17 October 2014),
the fate of the coalition government in Athens was sealed. The inevitability of SYRIZA’s
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Figure 5. Quotes by country/institution of origin, per period. [Colour figure can be viewed at
wileyonlinelibrary.com]
victory in the forthcoming election weakened Samaras’ currency in Europe and halted his
reformist momentum at home. His European ‘redemption’ was never to fully materialise.
Greece’s creditors had already started to prepare for ‘the day after’: the arrival of Alexis
Tsipras at the helm.
Explaining discursive change during the Greek crisis
Viewed in its entirety, across the four periods we have identified, our dataset depicts a
rather confusing pattern of elite discourses. First, we observe a lack of stable discursive
coalitions that are sustained throughout the period of our investigation (cacophony). For
example, there is no discernible ideological (along the left-right axis) or geographical
(i.e., ‘core’ versus ‘periphery’) cleavage shaping opinions on Greece, whereas significant
discursive discord is also evident among the three institutions that make up the Troika (see
Tables 2 and 3). These findings deviate from existing scholarship, which has pointed to
ideological (Schmidt 2014; Kaiser & Kleinen-von Königslöw 2016, 2017) or geographical
(Wodak & Angouri 2014; Kutter 2014; Ntampoudi 2014) factors shaping the discourse of
the Eurozone crisis.
A second observation relates to the question of prominence, understood here as the share
of certain individuals/countries/institutions in the overall volume of available quotes. The
visibility of German leaders in this respect is staggering, as the German Chancellor and
Finance Minister accounted (combined) for over a quarter of the total number of quotes in
our dataset (see Figure 5).This finding is in line with the claimsmade by Picard (2015: 14, 83–
102). More broadly, the narrative of the Greek crisis appears to have been overwhelmingly
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Table 4. Number of opinion scores, per stakeholder, per period
Origin Neglect
Suspicious
cooperation Blame
Reluctant
redemption Grand total
European Commission1 54 103 30 25 212
ECB2 31 53 7 10 101
IMF3 13 28 13 25 79
Troika 98 184 50 60 392
German4 55 109 61 69 294
French4 26 46 27 10 109
Dutch4 6 15 17 14 52
Finish4 5 15 6 5 31
Austrian4 5 10 6 6 27
Core 97 195 117 104 513
Italian4 8 5 27 6 46
Portuguese4 4 8 7 n/a 19
Spanish4 13 7 5 n/a 25
Irish4 3 10 6 n/a 19
Periphery 28 30 45 6 109
EU Council5 35 51 27 26 139
Left6 23 29 20 29 101
Right7 99 188 114 77 478
Centre8 3 8 28 4 43
Grand total 258 460 239 196 1,153
Notes: 1Commission President and Commissioner for Financial Affairs, combined. 2ECB President. 3IMF
Director. 4Head of Government and Finance Minister, combined. 5Eurogroup and European Council
Presidents, combined. 6Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from left and centre left party families,
combined. 7Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from right and centre right party families,
combined. 8Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from centre and liberal party families, combined.
Bold entries indicate aggregates.
shaped by the centre right of ‘core’EUmember states,with the number of quotes originating
from the centre left or the EU’s ‘periphery’ lagging far behind in all four periods (see
Table 4).
Third, we observe an absence of discursive leadership on the Greek crisis. For example,
for all of its prominence in terms of its share of the total number of quotes, there is no
statistical evidence to suggest a consistent correlation between Germany’s position and
those of other major stakeholders of the crisis (see Table 5). A similarly weak discursive
leadership can also be observed in the case of the Troika institutions (see Tables 2 and 3).
Here, too, our findings do not corroborate a Europeanisation effect in the discourse of the
crisis similar to that discussed by Kaiser and Kleinen-von Königslöw (2016, 2017).
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Fourth, the Pearson correlation coefficient between opinion scores on Greece (weekly
aggregated) and the spread of the ten-year Greek bond yield against the German Bund
(weekly aggregated) appears rather inconclusive: Neglect: 0.01, p = 0.96; Suspicious
cooperation: –0.7, p = 0.35; Blame: 0.3, p = 0.01; and Reluctant redemption: –0.30, p =
0.004 (see also Figure 4).9 This highlights the need for further research in disaggregating
possible correlations along national or institutional lines,but also in accounting for ‘external’
developments (e.g., the spreading of the crisis to other Eurozone members, announcement
of key policy initiatives), before firmer conclusions can be reached.
In explaining the shifts from one discursive period to another, a number of observations
can be made. During the period of neglect, the overall opinion score of –0.13 is primarily
explained by the large share of ‘neutral’ (denominated by ‘0’ in our coding) opinions on
Greece which accounted for 40 per cent of available quotes (see Figure 3). Over the same
period, the ‘core’, although dominant in terms of its combined share of quotes (see Figure 5),
does not register a statistically significant correlation pattern between Germany and the
rest of its members (see Table 5). By contrast, the rhetorical postures of the centre left and
the centre right are clearly aligned (see Table 3). The rhetoric of the ECB during this time
is also revealing.During the early stages of the crisis the ECB remained ominously silent on
Greece,with only five negative opinions out of a total of 31 during the entire period of neglect
(see Table 4). This reflected the ECB’s caution not to talk the euro down, but also Trichet’s
own scepticism over the bail-out itself and the emerging Troika-inspired solution for
Greece.
During the period of suspicious cooperation the pattern of discursive coalitions changes,
leading to the worsening of Greece’s image among its international creditors (see Figure
4). The share of ‘neutral’ opinions decreases substantially down to 15.7 per cent, with a
corresponding increase in the share of negative –1 and –2 scores up to 54.6 per cent of the
total (see Figure 3).Also significant is the decline in the share of quotes from the Eurozone’s
‘periphery’ from 11 to 6 per cent, which nevertheless appears to have been more negatively
disposed towards Greece than ‘core’ Eurozone members (see Figure 5 and Table 6). In the
context of financial ‘contagion’ and the spreading of the crisis to other parts of the Eurozone
‘periphery’, this reflected the growing concern among many southern European leaders not
to associate their own political fortunes with the fate of Greece. This may also explain the
strong correlation of opinion scores between the Eurozone’s ‘periphery’ and those of the
ECB (Table 2). The discursive posture of Germany during the same period also hardens
(see Table 6) and there is a statistically significant rhetorical alignment between ‘core’
Eurozone members and the IMF (Table 2). A similar alignment is also observable in the
positions of centre right politicians with those of the European Commission and the IMF
(Table 3).
The share of negative opinions on Greece increases further to over 72 per cent during
the period of blame, leading to a sharp decline of the overall opinion scores to –0.59 (the
lowest in the timeframe of our examination) (see Figure 3). Although the share of ‘Grexit
opinions’ (–2) remained rather small at 4.6 per cent of the total, their number nearly
doubled in absolute terms (see Table 7). The arrival of Mario Monti in Italy and Mario
Draghi at the ECB in November 2011 appears to have an important effect. Italy’s share of
quotes during this period rises to 11.3 per cent of the total (up from 1.1 per cent), whereas
statistically significant (positive) correlations can be observed in the opinions of centrist
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Table 6. Average opinion scores, per stakeholder, per period
Origin Neglect
Suspicious
cooperation Blame
Reluctant
redemption Grand total
Commission1 −0.26 −0.15 −0.37 0.48 −0.13
ECB2 0.13 −0.62 −0.14 0.40 −0.26
IMF3 0.00 0.00 −0.15 0.60 0.16
Troika −0.10 −0.26 −0.28 0.52 −0.10
German4 −0.16 −0.23 −0.87 0.10 −0.27
French4 0.08 −0.09 −0.15 0.40 −0.02
Dutch4 −0.67 −1.13 −1.29 −0.14 −0.87
Finish4 −1.20 −1.07 −0.83 −0.80 −1.00
Austrian4 −0.20 −0.30 −1.00 −0.33 −0.44
Core −0.19 −0.33 −0.77 0.03 −0.33
Italian4 0.50 −0.80 −0.19 0.50 −0.04
Portuguese4 0.50 −0.75 −1.00 n/a −0.58
Spanish4 −0.31 −0.86 −1.00 n/a −0.60
Irish4 −0.33 −0.50 −0.67 n/a −0.53
Periphery 0.04 −0.70 −0.47 0.50 −0.35
EU Council5 −0.20 0.04 −0.59 −0.04 −0.16
Left6 −0.09 −0.66 −0.60 0.17 −0.28
Right7 −0.14 −0.32 −0.81 0.00 −0.35
Centre8 −0.33 −0.88 −0.25 0.25 −0.33
Grand Total −0.13 −0.29 −0.59 0.18 −0.24
Notes: 1Commission President and Commissioner for Financial Affairs, combined. 2ECB President. 3IMF
Director. 4Head of Government and Finance Minister, combined. 5Eurogroup and European Council
Presidents, combined. 6Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from left and centre left party families,
combined. 7Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from right and centre right party families,
combined. 8Heads of Government and Finance Ministers from centre and liberal party families, combined.
n/a = not available. Bold entries indicate aggregates.
politicians with those expressed by the Council of the EU and the European Commission,
respectively (see Figure 5 and Table 3). By contrast, the frequency of interventions by the
ECB President decreases substantially, although his opinion scores on Greece correlate
strongly with those of the Eurozone’s ‘core’ and centre right politicians (see Tables 2, 3
and 4).
During the period of reluctant redemption the significant improvement of Greece’s
international profile (aggregate opinion score = 0.18) is driven primarily by a substantial
increase of positive opinion scores which, for the first time, account for more than 50 per
cent of the total (see Figure 3). Somewhat surprising, the arrival of Francois Hollande
in the French Presidency in May 2012 leads to a greater discursive alignment within the
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Table 7. Distribution of opinion scores, per period
Codification
Period −2 −1 0 1 2 Grand total
1. Politics of neglect 1 93 104 59 1 258
2. Suspicious cooperation 6 251 72 131 460
3. Blame 11 162 23 43 239
4. Reluctant redemption 3 65 21 107 196
Grand total 21 571 220 340 1 1,153
Sources:Reuters; authors’ own calculation.
Franco-German axis, evidenced by the distribution of their respective opinion scores (see
Table 6). Similarly, there is a statistically significant (positive) correlation of opinion scores
between the Council of the EU and those of the centre left and centre right, respectively
(see Table 3). Over the same period the share of quotes originating from the Eurozone’s
‘periphery’ decreases substantially, with only Italy barely registering an impact (see Figure
5). The discursive posture of the ‘periphery’, however, appears to be diverging from both the
Eurozone’s ‘core’ and the Council of the EU (converging, instead, with that of the IMF),
although these trends should be treated with caution given the relatively low number of
relevant observations (see Table 2).
Conclusion
This article scrutinised the evolving discourse(s) of senior EU and IMF figures on theGreek
crisis. By reference to the conceptual literature on DI and HI, we have argued that the
management of Greece’s financial implosion produced four discursive frames (‘neglect’,
‘suspicious cooperation’, ‘blame’ and ‘reluctant redemption’), reflecting the unfolding
economic and political drama in Athens, Brussels, Frankfurt and Washington. Viewed in
its entirety, we argued that the period 2008–2015 is characterised by discursive cacophony
(and volatility), underpinned by the lack of stable discursive coalitions and/or leadership.
The connection between elite discourse and market pressures on Greece’s borrowing costs
also appears inconclusive.
There are several ways in which the article contributes to our understanding of the
Greek and Eurozone crisis more broadly. Empirically, it is the first study to have examined
systematically an extensive dataset (1,153 unique quotes drawn from a body of 15,354
newswires from Reuters) on the communicative discourse of 63 senior officials with high
stakes in the Greek crisis.We have mapped out the evolution of this discourse by reference
to the changing pattern of discursive coalitions over time. This was evidenced by the
aggregation of our data along national and institutional lines, the identification of key
cleavages affecting the narrative of the crisis as well as an analysis of the correlation
coefficients of quotes originating from key (groups of) stakeholders. The relevance of this
data stretches beyond the narrow confines of the Greek case, offering an important resource
for scholars working on the management of the wider Eurozone crisis.
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Conceptually, the article moves the literature on DI forward in two important respects.
By incorporating insights from HI (particularly the concepts of ‘critical moments’ and
‘critical junctures’) into our analysis we have sought to explore more fully the dynamic
nature and evolving character of discourse in public policy. Such cross-fertilisation between
different strands of the institutionalist tradition is valuable in mitigating the critique against
DI as being rather static, but also in capturing the discursive volatility under conditions of
crisis management.
In addition, we have articulated a distinct way of identifying moments of discursive
change in longitudinal studies of public policy. Working inductively, we identified three
peaks in the media coverage of the Greek crisis and we hypothesised whether these
windows of opportunity (or critical moments) for the (re-)casting of elite discourse on the
crisis materialised into discursive critical junctures.Our results confirm that in the aftermath
of all three critical moments the content of elite discourses on Greece changed significantly,
thus producing distinct discursive frames in the management of the Greek crisis. Such an
inductive approach to the study of the interface between discourse and policy over time has
broader relevance in helping scholars to operationalise better some of the key insights of
DI and provide a more fertile ground for robust empirical testing through the use of large
datasets.
This study, however, has certain limitations which open up stimulating agendas for future
research. First, our focus on quotes by officials at the highest echelons of power provides
an important, but by no means exhaustive, account of the discourse that conditioned the
handling of the Greek crisis. Public statements by Prime Ministers, Finance Ministers and
central bankers tend to be heavily scripted and rather guarded – something that may explain
the relative scarcity of quotes at the two extremes of our ordinal coding scale. Yet, the
discourse onGreece (particularly with regards to explicit threats ofGrexit) was also affected
by statements made by less senior government ministers, parliamentary allies or opposition
leaders and/or senior officials at national central banks whose opinions often featured
heavily in the media. These were not captured by our analysis.
Second, our examination of the Reuters database has produced a sizable, but not
exhaustive, dataset of quotes originating from the 63 identified stakeholders of the Greek
crisis. Covering national (or other international) media outlets would have substantially
increased the number of our observations, thus strengthening the statistical power of
our analysis. Yet, such a research strategy would have to be mindful of issues of
national/editorial biases, duplication of entries and translation nuances which have the
potential to ‘contaminate’ the sample.
Third, although the article has sought to place the changing contours of elite discourse
on the Greek crisis in the context of a constantly evolving situation on the ground, we did
not explicitly interrogate the causal mechanisms between discourse and policy change. Such
an undertaking would involve a closer examination of the coordinative discourse of key
stakeholders as well as a closer look at the nature and the pursuit of their respective strategic
interests. Similarly, more research is required in nuancing the connection between markets
and elite rhetoric in the context of a multidimensional crisis conditioned by (the fear of)
contagion. Shedding more light onto these fields is critical for advancing our understanding
of the handling of the Eurozone crisis and the Greek case within it.
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Notes
1. Referring to countries with high credit rating scores and/or significant input into the design of the
Eurozone bail-outs.
2. Referring to countries that have lost access to the financial markets or came close to doing so.
3. Access to our dataset was facilitated through the subscription service Factiva (https://global-factiva-
com.manchester.idm.oclc.org/sb/default.aspx?NAPC=S).
4. When the exact same quote has been used in more than one Reuters newswire, only one entry was
recorded (i.e., when it first appeared). When the same newswire contains more than one quote, these
are recorded as separate entries.
5. The reliability coefficients were calculated per individual post-holder, rather than across the entire
dataset.
6. For this purpose,we searched theReuters database using the combined keywords ‘Greece’, ‘financial’ and
‘crisis’, aggregating our results on a weekly basis. The names of individual post-holders were not included
in this search. For a breakdown of these results, see Figure 1.
7. Conspiracy theories from the Ministry of Finance about the Spread rise,Kathimerini, 4 December 2008.
Available online at: http://news.kathimerini.gr/4dcgi/_w_articles_economy_2_04/12/2008_294591
8. Subsequently, Eurostat announced that the Greek budget deficit for 2009 was 15.9 per cent of GDP.
9. On the other hand, the correlations between the number of weekly quotes on Greece and the evolution
of the Greek spreads is statistically significant: Neglect: 0.64, p = 0.000; Suspicious cooperation: 0.46,
p = 0.000; Blame: –0.08, p = 0.68; and Reluctant redemption: 0.37, p = 0.005. Here, too, more research
is needed in delineating the precise nature of this correlation and the causalities that underpin it.
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